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Abstract
Incompatibility in markets with indirect network eﬀects can reduce consumers’ will-
ingness to pay if they value “mix and match” combinations of complementary network
components. For integrated ﬁrms selling complementary components, incompatibility
should also strengthen the demand-side link between components. In this paper, we
examine the eﬀects of incompatibility using data from a classic market with indirect
network eﬀects: Automated Teller Machines (ATMs). Our sample covers a period dur-
ing which higher ATM fees increased incompatibility between ATM cards and other
banks’ ATM machines. We ﬁnd that incompatibility led to lower willingness to pay for
deposit accounts. We also ﬁnd that incompatibility beneﬁted ﬁrms with large ATM
ﬂeets.
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11 ATM Markets as Hardware/Software Markets
ATMs markets are a classic example of a market with indirect network eﬀects.1 Consumers
must employ both an ATM card and an ATM machine to perform a cash withdrawal -
these are the complementary components of the network. Because ATM machines operate
o ns h a r e dn e t w o r k s ,c o n s u m e r sc a nu s et h e i rc a r da ta nA T Mo w n e db yt h e i rb a n ko r
another bank. The “mix and match” construction of the latter transaction type is a common
feature of emerging technologies, and is analogous to that involved in consumers’ matching of
computer hardware and software, operating systems and spreadsheets, diﬀerent components
of audio/visual systems, and a variety of other products with indirect network eﬀects. In
ATM markets as in many of the aforementioned examples, ﬁrms oﬀer both components of
the network, but consumers also have the opportunity to mix and match.
In markets with indirect network eﬀects, compatibility between components of the net-
work oﬀered by diﬀerent ﬁrms can have important eﬀects on consumers. In ATM markets,
the compatibility issue involves whether consumers can use their cards with other banks’
ATM machines. In its brief history, the ATM market has exhibited varying degrees of
compatibility along this dimension. At its inception the market exhibited complete incom-
patibility. ATM machines accepted only ATM cards issued by their owning bank. Over the
1980s, compatibility emerged as banks formed “shared ATM networks” that allowed cus-
tomers to use their cards at other banks’ “foreign” ATM machines. At that point, banks’
network membership determined the degree of compatibility. By the early 1990s, all banks
essentially subscribed to common networks, allowing full compatibility between cards and
machines.
In this paper, we examine a later shift toward partial incompatibility between cards and
foreign ATMs. This shift resulted from banks’ imposition of fees associated with foreign
transactions. There are two such fees: a “foreign fee” levied by the customer’s home bank,
and a “surcharge” imposed by the bank owning the foreign ATM. These fees in the limit
can create complete incompatibility, but as they stand create partial incompatibility. This
partial incompatibility has been the focus of the literature on “adaptors.” Our attention is
primarily devoted to surcharges, because in our sample foreign fees remain roughly constant
while there is a regime change in surcharging. Before 1996 the largest networks barred banks
1Economides (1989, 1991) and Matutes and Regibeau (1988, 1992) cite ATMs as an example of a market
with indirect network eﬀects.
2from imposing surcharges, while after 1996 surcharges became widespread.2 This represents
a discrete move toward incompatibility. There is also a certain amount of variation after
1996 in the degree to which surcharging is adopted. Some banks adopted surcharging quickly,
while others moved more slowly. Finally, within the set of banks that surcharge we observe
v a r i a t i o ni nt h el e v e lo ff e e s .
Empirically, this represents a rare opportunity to observe the eﬀects of a transition from
compatibility to incompatibility in a network industry. For any given bank, the compatibility
of its ATM cards with other banks’ ATM machines depends on the surcharging behavior of
other banks. Customers of a given bank will therefore link their valuation of deposit accounts
–which provide their ATM card–to the surcharging behavior of other banks owning ATMs
in their local market. It is this variation that we exploit. We beneﬁt from possessing
detailed geographic data regarding the local markets in which banks in our sample compete,
as well as rich information regarding ATM fees and ATM density for these local markets.
There is considerable cross-sectional and time-series variation in the extent to which banks’
competitors adopted surcharges. This allows a full examination of the eﬀects of transitions
from compatibility to incompatibility.
The theoretical literature on networks suggests that moving from compatibility to in-
compatibility will change consumer and ﬁrm behavior in a variety of ways. Incompatibility
should reduce aggregate willingness to pay for network systems, because it limits consumers’
ability to “mix and match” components oﬀered by diﬀerent ﬁrms. In our data, this should
manifest in a lower willingness to pay for deposit accounts, which provide consumers with
an ATM card and access to a bank’s own ATMs. A second partial equilibrium eﬀect of
incompatibility is that it can strengthen the link between pricing and/or quality for compo-
nents sold by the same ﬁrm–since consumer demand for components is now more tightly
linked. In our case, we expect that the advent of surcharging would increase the importance
of having a large ﬂeet of ATMs. This shift should be reﬂected in account pricing, and also
in the relationship between ATM ﬂeet size and deposit market share.
Our empirical approach consists of ﬁrst estimating a set of hedonic regressions linking
bank deposit account characteristics to pricing deposit accounts. These characteristics in-
clude not only hardware characteristics related to deposit accounts, but also ATM-related
characteristics. The hedonic regressions allow us to examine how incompatibility changes
2Sixteen states overrode the ban prior to 1996; we account for this in the empirical work below. See
Prager (2001) for an examination of this episode.
3overall prices on deposit accounts. They also allow us to examine how incompatibility
changes the link between ATM ﬂeet size quality and deposit account pricing; this link is the
indirect network eﬀect. Our ﬁndings are broadly consistent with the implications of models
with indirect network eﬀects. We ﬁnd that incompatibility reduces prices ceteris paribus,
but increases the strength of the link between ATM density and deposit account pricing. It
also reduces the strength of the link between other banks’ ATM density and deposit account
prices.
To further explore the relationship between compatibility and indirect network eﬀects, we
also estimate a set of reduced form regressions relating ATM density to deposit market share.
We ﬁnd that banks’ share of ATMs in their local ATM markets are positively related to their
shares of deposits, and that the strength of this correlation increases as other banks impose
surcharges. This is consistent with the theoretical result that incompatibility increases the
strength of indirect network eﬀects.
Our work relates to a small body of research examining the eﬀects of compatibility in
network markets. Greenstein (1994) ﬁnds that mainframe buyers prefer to upgrade to com-
patible systems, a result suggesting that compatibility between past and future hardware is
important. Gandal (1994, 1995) and Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (2001) ﬁnd that computer
spreadsheets compatible with the Lotus system commanded higher prices during the early
1990s. Our work diﬀers from this early work, in that it estimates the eﬀects of compatibil-
ity across diﬀerent components of the network–rather than the eﬀects of incompatibility
between diﬀerent networks. It also diﬀe r si nt h a ti tp r i m a r ily relies on within-ﬁrm and
within-market rather than cross-sectional variation in compatibility for identiﬁcation.3
Our study also relates to work establishing empirical relationships in network, taking
compatibility as given. Gandal, Greenstein and Salant (1999) study the link between oper-
ating system values and software availability in the early days of the microcomputer market.
They ﬁnd evidence supporting the existence of complementary feedback.4 More recent work
by Gandal, Kende and Rob (2002) seeks to establish a positive feedback link between adop-
3More precisely, the analyses in Gandal (1994, 1995) and Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (2001) do not separate
within-ﬁrm from cross-sectional eﬀects of compatibility. The datasets are panels, but too small to allow the
examination of within-ﬁrm variation.
4Their primary tests are a set of vector auto regressions (VARs) estimating whether there are signiﬁcant
intertemporal links between hardware (OS) advertising and software (actual software) advertising. they
compare the strength of these links for the two competing PC operating systems of the early 1980s (DOS
and CP/M), ﬁnding a much stronger complementary relationship for DOS than for CP/M.
4tion of Compact Disks (CDs) and CD players. Rysman (2000) provides evidence supporting
the existence of complementary demand relationships in a two-sided platform market (Yel-
low pages). More recent work by Shankar and Bayus (2002), Nair, Chintagunta and Dube
(2003) and Karaca-Mandic (2003) also applies structural econometric techniques to test for
the existence of network eﬀects in markets where compatibility is ﬁxed.
Finally, we also add to the empirical literature examining ATM markets. Much of this
literature only indirectly addresses the indirect network eﬀects between ATM cards and
machines. For example, McAndrews et al. (2002) examine banks’ propensity to impose
surcharges as a function of a variety of characteristics, although they do not explicitly link
t h e i ra n a l y s i st od e p o s i ta c c o u n tp r i c i n g . P r a g e r( 2 0 0 1 )t e s t sw h e t h e rs m a l lb a n k sl o s t
market share in states that allowed surcharges prior to 1996; this is implicitly a test of
whether incompatibility favored banks with high-quality ATM ﬂeets, although she does not
pose the question in those terms. She ﬁnds no evidence that small banks lost market share.
It should be noted, however, that her measure of the degree of incompatibility is indirect
because there is little data regarding the extent to which banks actually imposed surcharges
in the states that permitted them. Hannan and McDowell (1990) ﬁnd that markets in which
large banks adopted ATMs became more concentrated during the 1980s, although they do
not discuss their ﬁnding in terms of network economics. Finally, Saloner and Shepard (1995)
examine the diﬀusion of ATM machines from 1972-1979 and ﬁnd that adoption occurred
earliest for ﬁrms with many branches and deposits, a result they interpret as consistent with
the existence of indirect network eﬀects in demand.5
2 Deposit Accounts and ATM Services
ATM cards are generally sold as part of the service bundle attached to a consumer’s deposit
account. The deposit account is a checking account into which the customer deposits funds,
and from which the customer withdraws funds periodically for cash, debit card or check
purchases.6 In addition to deposit account services, bank oﬀer savings account services and
5Earlier work by Hannan and McDowell (1984a, 1984b) also examines the causes of ATM adoption but
does not test for network eﬀects.
6During our sample most ATM cards began serving as debit cards. We do not directly model the link
between these markets, although it appears that they are linked. The advent of surcharging in 1996, for
example, appears to have spurred increased use of debit cards for purchases. Consumers’ ability to substitute
away from ATM use following the imposition of surcharges would attenuate the link between surcharging
5a wide variety of other ﬁnancial services such as loans, brokerage and investment services
a n di n s u r a n c e . I np r i n c i p l e ,c o n s u m e r sc a np u r chase these separate services from separate
banks, and often do. However, deposit and ATM card services are bundled.
The standard deposit account agreement also oﬀers customers free access to the bank’s
own (ATMs). ATMs allow bank customers to perform transactions electronically on their
deposit accounts. Banks locate their ATMs “on-premise” at bank branches, and also “oﬀ-
premise” at locations such as convenience stores, movie theaters, bars, and other locations
where consumers typically need cash.
While banks’ strategic behavior is not the focus of our analysis here, it is worth highlight-
ing the most important features of competition between banks. In our sample, approximately
10,000 commercial banks compete for deposit account customers in their local markets.7
Smaller banks often operate only within a small geographic area such as a county, in many
cases using a single branch. The largest banks conduct operations in many states or even
nationally, and can have thousands of branches and ATMs. Markets are typically assumed
to exist at the county level, a convention that we adopt in our analysis in identifying banks’
competitors.8 There is considerable heterogeneity in market structure across regions, with
rural markets typically being more concentrated than urban markets. Even within markets,
there is considerable variation in banks’ ATM strategies–some banks blanket their markets
with ATMs, while others deploy them sparingly. As we will illustrate below, one of the most
systematic diﬀerences across banks regarding ATMs is that large banks deploy them more
aggressively than small banks (relative to maintaining branches, for example). Another is
that ATM deployment is largely concentrated in areas of high population density. We discuss
the implications of this fact in some detail below.
Banks subscribe to “shared ATM networks” that allow their customers to use other banks’
ATM machines. In most cases access to these “foreign” ATMs is incomplete because it only
allows consumers to withdraw cash; more complex transactions such as making deposits
and willingness to pay for deposit accounts, biasing our results toward zero.
7Our data omit observations for credit unions and thrifts. However, these institutions collectively hold
only a small share of the deposit market.
8Some work treats multi-county MSAs rather than individual counties as markets in urban areas–we
have seen no evidence that doing so makes a diﬀerence empirically. Recently, the question of whether banking
markets have become less local has come to light (see Radecki [1998] for a discusison). While this may be
true for products such as mortgages, it is unlikely to be true for consumers’ ATM usage, which is necessarily
local.
6are not permitted through the shared network. The networks themselves are typically joint
ventures formed by banks in order to share the ﬁxed costs of interconnection infrastructure.
Banks usually pay a ﬁxed monthly or annual membership fee to the network. They also
pay a “switch fee” for each transaction made by one of their customers on another bank’s
ATMs; the switch fee is roughly $0.40 on average during our sample, and does not vary
signiﬁcantly across networks or regions. Part (on the order of $0.10) of the switch fee is paid
as “interchange” to the network, and the remainder ﬂo w st ot h eA T M ’ so w n e ri no r d e rt o
compensate it for providing services to a non-customer.
Bank customers therefore purchase from their home bank a bundle of services associated
with the deposit account, including both an ATM card and unlimited access to that bank’s
ATMs. These bundles are diﬀerentiated both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal diﬀer-
entiation primarily stems from geography; consumers strongly prefer banks with branches
and ATMs that are conveniently located.9 The services other than deposits provided by
banks can confer both horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation. These complementary services
include oﬀering savings and money market accounts, oﬀering loans ranging from mortgages
to credit cards, and oﬀering brokerage services. Large banks are more likely to oﬀer these
services, although they become more widely available at banks of any size over our sample
period. Vertical diﬀerentiation also exists across features of the deposit account; banks vary
in quality of customer service, for example. A good deal of vertical diﬀerentiation stems
from ATM ﬂeet density.
For any given account bundle, customers will also base their willingness to pay on the
degree to which they can use other ﬁrms’ software–foreign ATMs. This depends on the
compatibility between cards and other banks’m a c h i n e s ,w h i c hi nt u r ni saf u n c t i o no ft h e
fees imposed by other banks for such use. Because discussing the impact of incompatibility
relates so closely to the network literature on incompatibility, we now discuss that literature
in order to motivate our empirical work.
3 Incompatibility and Network Eﬀects
In recent years a wide-ranging theoretical literature has emerged examining the eﬀects of
compatibility in markets with indirect network eﬀects. Indirect network eﬀects are strong
9See Stavins (1999) for a discussion of the characteristics that consumers favor when making their deposit
account choices.
7complementary relationships in demand between component products that consumers as-
semble into systems. In such settings there is a further distinction between components that
are “hardware” and components that are “software.” In such settings, “hardware” is the
component of the system that is durable or otherwise incurs greater switching costs. In
the case of ATMs, cards are hardware because they require the purchase of a subscription
good–the deposit account–that carries switching costs.
Considering the institutional detail of the ATM market, the most relevant models of
competition in markets with indirect network eﬀects are those in which integrated ﬁrms
sell both components of the system.10 The compatibility issue then becomes whether Firm
A’s components will function with Firm B’s complementary components, and vice versa.
Transactions of this sort, in which consumers purchase components from diﬀerent ﬁrms are
known as “mix and match” transactions. While much of the theoretical literature considers
cases of absolute compatibility or incompatibility, a related literature examines cases of
partial compatibility, where for example consumers can attain compatibility by paying an
“adaptor fee” enabling them to use incompatible software. The intuitions we highlight below
are generally robust to whether compatibility is absolute or adaptor-based.
The most general result of these models is that holding prices constant, incompatibility
reduces consumers’ willingness to pay. The strength of this eﬀect depends on the degree to
which consumers want to “mix and match” components from diﬀerent sellers. If demand
for such transactions is zero, incompatibility leaves consumers unchanged, but if demand for
mix and match transactions is high, incompatibility reduces aggregate willingness to pay.
These eﬀects may vary by ﬁrm; ﬁr m sw i t hh i g hd e m a n df o rm i xa n dm a t c ht r a n s a c t i o n s
will experience a larger reduction in willingness to pay. In our sample, we would expect this
implication to be reﬂected by a fall in prices as surcharging becomes prevalent. Banks with
low ATM density are those whose customers would have the highest demand for “mix and
match” transactions in which they would use the machine of another bank, implying that
banks with low density would experience the greatest fall in willingness to pay.11
10Chou and Shy [1989], Church and Gandal [1989], and Matutes and Regibeau [1989] consider cases
where network components are sold separately. Economides and Salop (1992) provide a comparison of
market structures characterized by diﬀerent forms of integration and ownership among component producers.
Matutes and Regibeau (1992) examine a case where ﬁrms produce both components of the network, but
may bundle them together.
11This abstracts from the selection eﬀect that would lead customers with inherently high “mix and match”
demand to migrate toward banks with large ATM ﬂeets. Such a selection bias will reduced the observed
8A second result of the network literature is that incompatibility strengthens the link
between the quality of one component and prices for the other. In our setting, we can see
this intuition by considering an environment with no ATM fees. In that case customers would
attach little or no value to a bank’s ATM density. Once incompatibility exists, however, the
ATM density becomes important.
A ﬁnal eﬀect that we examine is that incompatibility shifts relative competitive advan-
tage. While it may reduce willingness to pay for all ﬁrms, it will harm some more than
others. This might cause customers to migrate toward ﬁrms who suﬀer relatively less under
incompatibility. These ﬁrms will tend to be those with high quality or market power in
one component of the network. In our case, this would be reﬂe c t e di na ni n c r e a s e da b i l i t y
of banks with high ATM density to attract customers after the advent of surcharging, be-
cause they become relatively more attractive–particularly to customers with high “mix and
match” demand.
The fact that ATM and banking behavior involves travel is also important. Most models
of ATM/banking competition portray consumers as facing travel costs to use ATMs. This
inﬂuences, for example, the marginal decision regarding whether to use a close foreign ATM
(which carries fees) or a more distant own ATM. In general, we would expect that the
implications discussed above would be stronger for consumers facing high travel costs. At
zero travel costs, for example, consumers would never use a foreign ATM or pay fees as long
as their home bank had one ATM somewhere.
While quantifying travel costs is diﬃcult, it is widely accepted that areas with high
population density have signiﬁcantly higher travel costs than non-dense rural areas. To
account for this, in the empirical work below we present results for subsamples of high and
low population density. This turns out to be quite important.
There are limitations to our approach. Broadly speaking, these limitations are related
to the partial equilibrium framework implicit in our discussion above. This framework takes
a number of features of competition as relatively exogenous; we discuss the implications of
our approach below.
A ﬁrst limitation of our approach is that it abstracts from the compatibility choice at
the ﬁrm level. Firms clearly choose the level of incompatibility, meaning that it is jointly
determined with other features of competitive equilibrium. In our case, we can make an
argument that the shift is more exogenous than most for two reasons. One reason is that
diﬀerence between banks with high and low ATM density.
9ﬁrms were constrained prior to 1996 by the by-laws of the largest networks from surcharging.
The advent of surcharging after 1996 therefore resulted from the removal of a constraint,
rather than a shift in strategic behavior. A second reason for at least weak exogeneity of
incompatibility is that we examine how surcharging by a ﬁrm’s competitors aﬀect its pricing,
rather than how its own surcharging aﬀects its own pricing. Of course, in concentrated local
banking markets such decisions are interrelated, but the relationship is less direct.
A second limitation of our partial equilibrium approach is that it takes ﬁrms’ character-
istics as given–most notably their software quality, as measured by the size of their ATM
ﬂeet. There is little question that the advent of surcharging changed the business model for
ATM operations and accelerated the deployment of ATMs; this will become apparent when
we discuss the descriptive statistics below. However, for our purposes the deployment deci-
sion is not the margin of interest. We are interested in measuring how changes in deployment
aﬀect pricing for deposit accounts under both compatibility and incompatibility. In future
work we plan to examine how incompatibility aﬀects the deployment decision, but for now
we leave that issue aside.
A further constraint on our study here is that it largely ignores the implications of
incompatibility for strategic pricing among ﬁrms. Our approach is consumer-oriented; we
estimate the eﬀects of incompatibility on willingness to pay and customer migration. These
exercises are surely clouded by supply-side inﬂuences. For example, a substantial body of
work exists examining the eﬀects of incompatibility on the intensity of price competition.
This work yields mixed results, with some studies ﬁnding that incompatibility reduces the
intensity of price competition and others ﬁnding that it increases the intensity of price
competition. While our reduced form approach below can not explicitly separate these
eﬀects on prices from those following from willingness to pay, we discuss our results below
with an eye toward the interaction between the shift to incompatibility and a shift in strategic
behavior.
Finally, our work does not address the policy questions associated with incompatibility
in general, and ATM fees in particular. A general result of the theoretical literature on
incompatibility is that markets may display “too much” incompatibility from a social welfare
perspective. In ATM markets, this argument has been made implicitly (though rarely in
the language of the network economics literature) by those who attack ATM fees as “too
high.” We plan to explore these issues more fully in further work; that work will employ a
structural techniques more appropriate for the sort of welfare calculations inherent in these
10policy debates.
4 Empirical Speciﬁcations and Tests
I nt h i ss e c t i o nw ed e s c r i b et h eh e d o n i cp r i c er e g r e s s i o n st h a tw eu s et om e a s u r et h ei m p a c t
of ATMs on deposit account pricing. We then describe the reduced form regressions relating
bank characteristics to movements in market share.
4.1 Hedonic Pricing Models
A wide literature has used hedonic methods to estimate the relationship between product
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c sa n dw i l l i n g n e s st op a y ,a sr e ﬂected in prices.12 This is also the approach
taken in some other studies of compatibility. In our case, we observe characteristics of
deposit account bundles oﬀered at the bank/year level; we denote these characteristics by
Xit. The hedonic pricing model is speciﬁed as:
pit = Xitβ + αi + γt + εit
where the coeﬃcients β represent the incremental contributions of each characteristic to
willingness to pay, and αi and γt are ﬁxed bank and year eﬀects.
A given bank’s bundle consists of two types of characteristics, corresponding to diﬀerent
components of the network. The ﬁrst type is a characteristic associated with the deposit
account. For example, banks vary in their quality of customer service. Some of these
characteristics will be absorbed into the ﬁxed bank eﬀects, since they do not vary over
time.13
The second type of characteristic valued by consumers is that associated with the ATM
services attached to their deposit account. Because traveling to ATMs to get cash is time-
consuming, consumers value having access to close ATMs when they experience an unan-
ticipated need for cash. ATMs therefore increase willingness to pay by reducing expected
12The pioneering work of Rosen (1974) is often cited as justiﬁcation for hedonic models measuring will-
ingness to pay. The limitations of hedonic models have also been studied, most notably that the parameter
estimates do not represent the primitives of consumers’ willingness to pay. See, for example Pakes (2003).
13We can still learn something about their contribution to the hedonic price by regressing the ﬁxed eﬀects
on these ﬁxed bank characteristics; we outline this technique and its results in Appendix B. Chamberlain
(1982).
11travel costs to use an ATM. Absent ATM fees, we would expect consumers to value all ATMs
roughly equally (since possessing a card grants them access to all ATMs in their region); any
increase in the overall density of ATMs in their market should increase their willingness to
pay for a deposit account. In general, we would expect that consumers would make some
assessment of their likely use of ATMs and use that to calculate their expected costs of ATM
usage (in time and money). This estimate would aﬀect their willingness to pay for the ATM
card (and other services attached to the deposit account).
This implies that in the absence of incompatibility, prices should be related to bank
characteristics, own ATM density and competitors’ ATM density:
ln(pit)=β1BankCharit + β2 ln(OwnDensit)+β3 ln(CompDensit)+αi + γt + εit
We measure density as machines per square mile over all counties in which the bank
operates. We use logs to reﬂect the fact that each additional machine reduces the expected
travel distance to use an ATM by a successively smaller amount.
Our measure of deposit account prices divides annual income associated with deposit




This measure reﬂects the annual price per dollar of deposit account balances.14 The fee
income measure includes revenue from monthly account fees, fees on bounced checks, per-
check transaction charges, extra fees for returned checks, and in rare cases fees for the use
of tellers’ services. It also includes “foreign fee” income; we discuss the implications of this
below. It does not include income from surcharges, as surcharge revenue is collected from
non-customers and therefore falls into a separate revenue category.
One important measurement issue associated with our price measure is that the income
and deposit variables include not only demand (checking) deposit balances but also balances
f o ro t h e rt y p e so fd e p o s i t ss u c ha sm o n e ym a r k e t sa n dC D s .f o rt h en u m e r a t o rt h i si sn o t
much of an issue, as these other types of account rarely carry fees. However, the denominator
overstates balances. In most cases, demand deposit balances average roughly 10 percent of
total deposits. Econometrically, the measurement error in our denominator need not pose
a problem if it is orthogonal to our right-hand side. However, the measurement error does
14See the Data Appendix for more detail on the construction of this variable.
12change the economic interpretation of our coeﬃc i e n t s .W en o t et h i sw h e nw ed i s c u s s i n gt h e
data and empirical results.
Another issue associated with our price measure is that it includes revenue from foreign
fees. On one level this seems methodologically correct since foreign fees are part of the price
of the bank’s own deposit account bundle. However, foreign fees also inﬂuence the marginal
cost to a consumer of using another bank’s ATM. for this reason foreign fees inﬂuence
incompatibility. To handle this issue, we construct two measures of incompatibility, one that
depends only on competitors’ surcharging and one that also depends on foreign fees. We
now discuss the construction of these variables.
4.2 Modeling Incompatibility
Incompatibility has two eﬀects in the hedonic model. The primary eﬀect of incompatibility
is that it reduces the value of competitors’ software. This should be reﬂected in a reduc-
tion on the inﬂuence of competitors’ software on willingness to pay. A secondary eﬀect of
incompatibility is that it should increase the marginal impact of own software quality on
willingness to pay. This is because consumers can substitute less eﬀectively under incom-
patibility, strengthening the direct link between quality and prices.
We measure incompatibility in three ways. First, because the primary change in com-
patibility was discrete following regulatory changes, we construct a dummy variable equal to
one if the state in which a bank has primary operations allows surcharging.15 This variable
is equal to one for all observations after 1996, and also equal to one for any bank operating
in a state that overrode the surcharge ban prior to 1997.
The second way we measure incompatibility is by quantifying the expected surcharge a





The expected surcharge is the average of surcharges at other banks’ ATMs, where the
weights are the shares of total ATMs held in the market by the other banks. The motivation
for this speciﬁcation is an assumption that consumers know something about the distribution
of ATMs and ATM fees in their local market, but do not have perfect knowledge regarding
15We deﬁne the state of “primary operations” as that in which the bank holds the greatest dollar value of
deposits.
13either speciﬁc fees at each ATM or the locations in which they will experience an unantic-
ipated need for cash. Because we possess surcharge data for only the largest ATM issuers
in each market, constructing this expectation requires making an assumption about the sur-
charging behavior of smaller issuers. We outline these assumptions and discuss robustness
in the Data Appendix.
As mentioned in the previous section, we also construct an incompatibility measure that
depends on the bank’s own foreign fees:




Using this measure will bias the coeﬃcient on this variable when it is on the right-hand
side of the hedonic regression, because higher fees per se lead to higher prices when our price
measure includes foreign fee income. This limits our ability to interpret these coeﬃcients.
We incorporate the eﬀects of incompatibility by interacting the incompatibility measure
with ATM characteristics. This yields the following speciﬁcations, where Incompatit refers
generically to any of the three measures above:
pit = β1BankCharit + β2 ln(OwnDensit)+β3 ln(CompDensit)+
β4Incompatit ln(OwnDensit)+β5Incompatit ln(CompDensit)+αi + γt + εit
4.3 Market Share Regressions
As a further test of the relationship between incompatibility and market outcomes, we specify
a reduced form relationship between market share and bank-level characteristics. This allows
us to estimate whether the increase in incompatibility following surcharging changed the
relationship between ATM-related characteristics and market share. We begin with the
following relationship:
DepShareit = β1ATMShareit + β2BankCharsit + δi + ηt + εit
The dependent variable in these regressions is the bank’s share of the local deposit markets
in which it competes. The bank characteristics include the bank’s share of branches in its
local markets, as well as its average salaries per employee and employees per branch. The
ATM share variable measures the bank’s share of total ATMs in its local markets. The
speciﬁcations also include ﬁxed year and bank eﬀects.
14The speciﬁcation above omits prices, which would clearly inﬂuence market share but are
also endogenous. for the purposes of comparison, we also estimate fuller speciﬁcations that
include prices on the right-hand side:
DepShareit = β1ATMShareit + β2BankCharsit + β3pit + δi + ηt + εit
We incorporate the eﬀects of incompatibility by interacting the ATM share variable with




The most serious econometric concern with our speciﬁcations above is endogeneity. We would
expect that a bank’s ATM density or share and deposit fees might be determined jointly as
part of a bank’s overall business strategy, or both aﬀected by unobservable variables. Branch
density/share and our other bank-level characteristics might also be endogenous for similar
reasons. If banks set fees strategically, we might also expect competitors’ surcharging to be
related to a bank’s ATM density or deposit fees.
The endogeneity problem seems likely to be most acute in the market share regressions,
which also have prices on the right-hand side. In these regressions we instrument for prices
using a bank-level measure of costs, the loan loss ratio.16 It is more diﬃcult to think of
an appropriate instrument for ATM density. In cases where it is diﬃcult to conceive of
appropriate instruments, our approach is to make clear that we are not identifying causal
links between the right-hand side variables and our dependent variables. Our empirical
tests simply seek to identify shifts in the correlations between our right-hand and dependent
variables; we estimate the extent to which these shifts are linked to incompatibility.
As e c o n dd i ﬃculty with our data is that some right-hand side variables are measured
with error (see the Data Appendix for a full discussion of this issue). We attempt to account
for this by modifying our estimated standard errors.
16We construct the loan loss ratio by dividing the bank’s annualized loan losses by its year-end aggregate
loan balances.
155 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 present descriptive statistics for our sample. The Data Appendix outlines deﬁnition
and measurement issues for these variables. We take our data from a variety of sources.
The ATM-related characteristics come from the Card Industry Directory, an annual trade
publication listing data on ATM ﬂeets and fees for the largest three hundred ATM issuers.
Many of those issuers are multi-bank holding companies; this gives us data for roughly 4500
bank/years over the sample period 1994-1999.
In most cases we report median values for our data, because the data are highly skewed.
O n es o u r c eo fs k e w n e s si sb a n ks i z e ;f o re x a m p le, while the median bank size (in deposits)
is $326 million, the mean is $2.3 billion. The tenth and ninetieth percentiles are $58 million
and $5.8 billion. Another source of skewness is geographic diversity, realized largely through
diﬀerences in branches and ATMs per square mile. The only variables for which we report
means are those that are not skewed: deposit fees, ATM fees and our analogous measures
for competitors, salary per employee and employees per branch.
The top rows show data by year regarding deposits, branches and ATMs, as well as market
share data for each of these three variables. These share variables remain roughly constant
over our sample, despite a steady increase in median bank size. This reﬂects changes in the
composition of our sample; during the late 1990s, banks consolidated but primarily across
markets rather than within them. Thus, the typical bank became larger but did not expand
within-market shares. Our competitor-based variables show that ATM deployment grew
faster than branch density. Overall, deposit fees remained constant for the sample overall,
as did foreign fees. Surcharges became quite prevalent between 1997 and 1999, which nearly
doubled a customer’s expected costs for using a foreign ATM. Salary per employees and
employees per branch remained essentially constant.
While the data in Table 1 would suggest that little changed after the advent of surcharg-
ing, a closer look at the data reveal otherwise. In order to clarify the issue, we present data
in Table 2 that are stratiﬁed in two ways. First, we separate banks into those operating
in areas of high population density from those operating in areas of low population density.
We also separate large and small banks, based on local ATM share. We categorize as “high
density” any bank operating in areas with an average population density above the sample
median, and the remainder as operating in “low density” areas. We further segment these
subsamples, treating as “large” any bank in the subsample with a share of the local ATM
market larger than the median (for that subsample).
16These data show a clear pattern in which the greatest changes following the advent of
surcharging occurred by large banks in dense areas. In these markets, large banks become
larger and small banks become smaller, as measured by deposit share. There is little anal-
ogous movement in branch density, which changes little for either size category. The most
dramatic changes are in ATM density, which doubles for large high-density banks but is
unchanged for smaller high-density banks. This is associated with equally dramatic changes
in prices. Large banks charge signiﬁcantly higher ATM fees. They also charge higher de-
posit fees. More importantly, this deposit fee gap grows signiﬁcantly after the advent of
surcharging, from $0.60 in 1995 to $1.66 in 1999.
There is little evidence of such change in low density areas. While there are diﬀerences
between large and small banks, they are not nearly so dramatic. Nor do they change very
much after the advent of surcharging.
The overall pattern illuminated by these data are that surcharging is coincident with
substantial changes in high-density (i.e. urban) banking markets, but little change in rural
banking markets. In these high-density markets, large banks increase the size of their ﬂeets.
Large banks are no more likely to impose high surcharges than small banks in these markets,
but they have begun to charge signiﬁcantly higher deposit fees. They also have begun
attracting deposit market share, apparently at the expense of smaller banks.
6 Results
Table 3 presents the results of our hedonic regressions examining the relationship between
incompatibility, bank/ATM characteristics and pricing. In general our results show an in-
tuitive relationship between bank characteristics and prices.17 In each of the speciﬁcations,
both salary per employee and employees per branch are positively related to prices. In
a somewhat puzzling development, there appears to be no systematic relationship between
branch density and prices (mention Dick paper, note that she does not have ATM density...).
Our baseline speciﬁcation in column 1 omits the incompatibility measures, restricting
the relationship between ATMs and prices to be identical across all regimes of compatibility.
In this baseline speciﬁcation we observe a positive relationship between own ATM density
and prices, but no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between competitors’ ATM density
and prices. A one percent increase in own ATM density increases willingness to pay by .028
17Note that the bank-level ﬁxed eﬀects capture bank characteristics that do not vary over time.
17p e r c e n t .W h i l et h i si sas m a l le l a s t icity, it is economically signiﬁcant when we consider the
fact that in our sample, some banks increase their ATM density by as much as three hundred
percent.
The next three models include the density/incompatibility interaction terms. In each
case, the results suggest that incompatibility strengthens the relationship between own ATMs
and deposit account prices. The results are robust to the incompatibility measure, although
they are slightly weaker for the surcharge dummy measure than the others. This is not
surprising given that this is a weaker proxy for incompatibility, and also given that incom-
patibility may have not existed prior to 1997 even where surcharging was permitted by law.
The economic signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients are large; they suggest that the relationship be-
t w e e no w nA T M sa n dp r i c e sm a yh a v eb e e na sm u c ha st w i c ea sl a r g eu n d e ri n c o m p a t i b i l i t y .
Including the interaction terms makes the coeﬃcient on competitors’ density statistically
signiﬁcant, and while it is predictably less than that on own density it is also economically
signiﬁcant. More importantly, the coeﬃcients on the interaction terms suggest that in-
compatibility reduces the relationship between competitors’ ATM density and prices. This
is consistent with our expectations. The magnitude of the results implies that by 1999 the
relationship between competitors’ ATMs and own deposit prices had essentially disappeared.
T h el a s tt w oc o l u m n ss p l i tt h es a m p l eb a s e do nt h ep o p u l a t i o nd e n s i t yo ft h em a r k e t si n
which the bank operates, at the median density. The ﬁrst column (Model 5) shows results
for banks in low density markets, while the second column (Model 6) shows results for the
banks in high density markets. We use the expected surcharge measure, although the results
are similar using either of the other two.
These results corroborate the pattern discussed in the descriptive statistics above. All
of the relevant relationships–between own or competitors’ density and prices, and between
incompatibility and prices–are much stronger in high-density markets than in low density
markets. In fact, they are nearly nonexistent in these low-density areas.
Table 4 present results from our market share regressions. As might be expected, there
is an extremely strong relationship between branch share and deposit share–nearly one to
one, and estimated very precisely. Salaries per employee and employees per branch have
the expected signs, although the salary variable is only signiﬁcant in one model. The price
variable is negative and signiﬁcant when it is included, although the coeﬃcients on the
other variables do not change much depending on whether it is included. We again present
speciﬁcations for all three of our incompatibility measures.
18The results show a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between ATM share
and deposit share. They also show that this relationship is stronger under incompatibility.
This result holds regardless of the incompatibility measure that we use. In the last two
columns, we again stratify the sample based on density, with similar results. The relation-
ships between ATM share and deposit share, and the eﬀects of incompatibility, are much
stronger for banks operating in high density areas.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
This pattern of results suggests that the interplay between compatibility and pricing is
important, and that links between pricing and quality for diﬀerent products linked by indirect
network eﬀects can be quite strong. This is particularly useful to know since many previous
studies of network markets have examined only one component and essentially ignored the
other.
It is important to be circumspect about the policy implications of these ﬁndings. While
they do seem to indicate a competitive advantage by large banks, this competitive advan-
tage might be welfare-enhancing if it reﬂects increased quality. It appears that large banks
dramatically increase the quality of their software, by increasing the density of their ATM
deployment. This could easily explain the shifts in deposit pricing and market share.
A Data Appendix: Sources and Variable Construction
A.1 Primary Data Sources
We take our data from four principal sources. The ﬁrst is the Card Industry Directory, an
annual trade publication listing detailed data on ATM and debit card issuers. The Card
Industry Directory contains data for the largest 300 ATM card issuers, who collectively own
roughly XX percent of the nation’s ATM ﬂeet during our sample period. These issuers are
most often commercial banks, although some are bank holding companies, credit unions
or thrifts. The sample period covered in our data set runs from 1994 to 2002. Data are
measured on January 1 of each year.
We also take data from the FDIC Reports of Condition and Income, or Call Reports.
The Call Report data are collected quarterly by the FDIC for every commercial bank in the
19country. The Call Reports contain detailed balance sheet and income data for each bank.
They also indicate which bank holding company owns the bank. Thus, if the Card Industry
Directory contains a listing regarding ATM issuance for a bank holding company, we can
match that data with the corresponding data for each bank owned by the holding company.
The Call Reports do not contain data for credit unions or thrifts; we drop them from the
sample.
We supplement the above with data from the FDIC Summary of Deposits Database
(SOD). The SOD lists the location of branches for every bank and thrift in the country.
It also lists the deposits held at each branch. It does not contain data on branch location
for credit unions. We assume that each credit union has one branch, located in its home
county, and that all of that credit union’s deposits are held at that branch. This assumption
is unlikely to aﬀect our results. SOD data are collected each June.
A.2 An Observation in Our Data
By cross-referencing the data sets above, we obtain observations at the issuer level describing
e a c hi s s u e r ’ sb a l a n c es h e e ta c t i v i t ya n dA T Ma c t i v i t y .W ea l s ou s et h eg e o g r a p h i cd a t af r o m
the SOD to derive information about the market(s) in which the issuer competes. Because
the data are measured at diﬀerent times, we must establish a concordance between the
dates in the diﬀerent data sets. We establish the concordance based on the fact that our
analysis includes deposit prices and quantities as LHS variables, and ATM-related variables
as RHS variables. While these are jointly determined, to mitigate the endogeneity problem
we match ATM-related data for each January with six-month ahead data from the other
data sets. Thus an observation from 1994 contains ATM-related data from January 1994,
while all other data are from June 1994. We describe these data below.
A.2.1 Pricing for Accounts and ATMs
For each issuer, we observe its income associated with deposit accounts over the year preced-
ing the observation date. The primary component of such income is income from monthly
service charges on deposit accounts. It also includes foreign fee income paid by its customers
stemming from the use of other issuers’ ATMs. It also includes a variety of other fees such
as NSF fees for bounced checks and other penalty fees on deposit accounts. If the issuer is a
bank holding company, we sum its deposit fee income for all banks in the holding company.
20To develop our measure of prices, we divide income on deposit accounts by the end-of-
year dollar value of deposits (in thousands). This price measure therefore represents the
average fees paid per dollar of deposits; this is a measure of the opportunity cost of holding
dollars in a checking account. This measure omits the additional opportunity cost of holding
deposits in checking, which is the forgone savings interest income. However, it is likely that
the measurement error associated with omitting this component of “prices” is similar across
banks, and within banks over time.18
Another issue associated with using this price measure is that banks typically oﬀer con-
sumers account options with lower explicit fees in exchange for maintaining higher minimum
balances. If banks diﬀer systematically in the composition of their customer bases, we will
understate fees at banks with high deposits per customer (assuming those customers sort
into accounts designed for them).
Ap r a c t i c a ld i ﬃculty with using this measure of fees is that the numerator is a ﬂow
measure over the previous year, while the denominator is a stock measure at end-of-year.
This creates measurement error for banks with large deposit acquisitions or divestitures
during the year. Indeed, there are a signiﬁcant number of observations with implausibly
small or large fee measures. To check that these were outliers stemming from measurement
error, we measured the year-to-year percentage change in deposits for observations with
exceedingly small or high fee measures; we found that in most cases such observations were
for banks that experienced extremely large changes in deposits (more than ﬁfty percent in
absolute value). We drop these observations. In unreported speciﬁcations we also include
these observations but truncate the fee variable at “reasonable” values, with little diﬀerence
in the qualitative results.
For each issuer in the Card Industry Directory, we also observe its foreign ATM fee and
surcharge at the beginning of the year for the observation. In some cases, the bank lists a
range for these fees. In that case, we use the highest fee reported. In the empirical work, this
tends to understate the true relationship between fees and our other variables of interest.
A.3 Deposits, Market Share and Other Issuer-Level Variables
A.3.1 Market Share Variables
18Large banks tend to pay lower interest than smaller banks. This may refect quality diﬀerences or market
power. If savings rate diﬀerences stem from market power and consumers face switching costs, we will slightly
overstate the price diﬀerence between large and small banks using our fee income variable.
21For each issuer, we observe its total deposits, ATMs and branches. We also observe the
distribution of its deposits and branches across individual counties. We also observe the
issuer’s market share within each county, in terms of both branches and deposits. Thus, for
each county in which an issuer operates, we know its share of all branches/deposits in that









This information allows us to construct a number of issuer-level variables. First, we can
measure the issuer’s weighted deposit/branch market share across all counties by constructing





Constructing an estimate of the issuer’s ATM market share weighted across all the coun-
ties in which it operates introduces two diﬃculties we do not face with the branch/deposit
data. First, for a given issuer we do not observe the actual distribution of ATMs across
counties. We deal with this by assuming that the issuer’s share of ATMs in each county is
equal to its share of branches in that county. In other words, we estimate
ATMijt = αijtATMit
This implies that the issuer maintains a constant ratio of ATMs per branch in all geographic
regions. While this may not be true in practice, our empirical results derive from within-
issuer changes in ATM deployment. Our imputation method then reduces to an assumption
that changes in issuers’ deployment strategies are reﬂected equally in all counties.
A second diﬃculty with our ATM data is that we only observe ATM deployments for
the largest 300 issuers. This creates a problem because estimating the issuer’s share of total
ATMs within a particular county requires knowing the total number of competitors’ ATMs in
that county. Therefore we must estimate the number of ATMs deployed by other FIs within
22t h ec o u n t y .I no r d e rt oe s t i m a t et h en u m b e ro fA T M sd e p l o y e db yo t h e rF I s ,w ee s t i m a t ea
within-sample regression of ATMs on branches, year dummies and year/branch interaction
terms. To control for the fact that larger FIs have a greater ratio of ATMs to branches, we
also interact the branch variables with the log of issuer size (in deposits). We then construct
ﬁtted values of ATMs for each FI for which we do not have ATM data. In order to check
the sensibility of this procedure, we compared the ﬁtted total number of ATMs from this
procedure to aggregate data on ATM deployment. The ﬁgures match fairly closely.
A ﬁnal point regarding the measurement of ATM share is that it omits ATMs deployed
by Independent Service Operators (ISOs). This introduces measurement error, and may bias
our measures of competitors’ ATM density.
A.3.2 Density and Demographic Variables
We also estimate the density of each issuer’s branches and ATMs per square mile. We
construct these estimates by aggregating the square mileage of every county in which the
issuer operates. We then divide the issuer’s total ATMs and branches by this ﬁgure.
We also possess population density and income data for each county in which an issuer
operates. To aggregate these data up to the issuer level, we construct weighted averages
b a s e do nt h ei s s u e r ’ ss h a r eo fi t st o t a ld e p o s i t si ne a c hc o u n t y .
B Second-Stage Hedonics
A number of bank-level characteristics are ﬁxed at the bank level over time. This precludes
their inclusion in the hedonic regressions, which also include bank ﬁxed eﬀects. However,
we can learn something about the value of these other characteristics by examining their
relationship to the ﬁxed eﬀects.
Starting with our estimates b αi of the bank ﬁxed eﬀects, we construct the vector Πi of
time-invariant bank characteristics. The ﬁrst set of such characteristics describes the product
oﬀerings of each bank; there are dummies equal to one if the bank oﬀers a credit card,
money market accounts, or brokerage services. We also include a dummy if the bank has
branches in multiple counties, and a dummy equal to one if the bank is part of a larger bank
holding company. We further interact the bank holding company with a dummy indicating
that the bank is “small,” having deposits of less that $250 million. Presumably, if there
are unmeasurable beneﬁts to being part of a bank holding company because the holding
23company provides ancillary services or confers higher quality, small banks would stand to
gain the most.
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27C Tables and Figures
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Deposits/bank ($millions) 264 302 322 412 490 509
Deposit share 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.13
Branches/bank 6 7 7 7 8 7
Branches/square mile 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008
Branch share 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10
ATMs/bank 7 8 10 11 14 14
ATMs/square mile 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.013
ATM share 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12
Competitors’ ATMs/square mile 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.19 0.22
Competitors’ branches/square mile 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.16
Deposit fees ($ per $1000 of deposits) 2.48 2.50 2.50 2.31 2.39 2.45
Foreign fee ($) 1.20 1.31 1.31 1.19 1.23 1.16
Surcharge ($) n/a n/a n/a 0.67 0.91 0.95
Expected competitors’ surcharge ($) n/a n/a n/a 0.53 0.73 0.88
Salary per employee ($1000) 16 16 17 18 19 20
Employees per branch 17 16 16 16 16 15
Sources: Federal Reserve Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports),
years; FDIC Summary of Deposits, various years; Card Industry Directory,
various years.
28Table 2. Summary Statistics by ATM Share and Population Density
Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Deposit share: large bank, high density 0.192 0.199 0.188 0.202 0.206 0.208
small bank, high density 0.040 0.038 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.029
large bank, low density 0.296 0.292 0.285 0.315 0.326 0.320
small bank, low density 0.143 0.148 0.153 0.151 0.173 0.152
Branches/ large bank, high density 0.037 0.036 0.038 0.042 0.035 0.039
square mile: small bank, high density 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.012
large bank, low density 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.012
small bank, low density 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.005
ATMs/ large bank, high density 0.043 0.047 0.054 0.066 0.084 0.091
square mile: small bank, high density 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.014 0.013
large bank, low density 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.012
small bank, low density 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004
Deposit fees: large bank, high density 2.87 2.89 2.89 3.01 3.29 3.29
small bank, high density 2.37 2.32 2.15 2.06 1.91 1.82
large bank, low density 2.46 2.72 2.87 2.92 2.54 2.73
small bank, low density 2.51 2.40 2.40 2.42 2.28 2.43
Surcharge: large bank, high density n/a n/a n/a 0.82 1.11 1.18
small bank, high density n/a n/a n/a 0.47 0.95 0.91
large bank, low density n/a n/a n/a 0.92 1.27 1.25
small bank, low density n/a n/a n/a 0.84 1.10 1.05
Foreign fee: large bank, high density 1.33 1.37 1.43 1.35 1.37 1.29
small bank, high density 1.12 1.23 1.20 1.04 1.08 1.01
large bank, low density 1.31 1.45 1.51 1.32 1.48 1.40
small bank, low density 1.19 1.36 1.28 1.18 1.24 1.16
29Table 3. Hedonic Regression Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
ln(own ATM density) 0.028∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.005 0.030∗ 0.020
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014)
ln(own ATM density) 0.009∗∗∗
×surcharge dummy (0.003)
ln(own ATM density) 0.024∗∗∗ 0.002 0.029∗∗∗
×E(surcharge) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
ln(own ATM density) 0.020∗∗∗
×foreign ATM cost (0.004)
ln(competitors’ ATM density) 0.003 0.011 0.019∗ 0.048∗∗∗ −0.004 0.029∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
ln(competitors’ ATM density) −0.016∗∗∗
×surcharge dummy (0.004)
ln(competitors’ ATM density) −0.031∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.035∗∗
×E(surcharge) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
ln(competitors’ ATM density) −0.031∗∗∗
×foreign ATM cost (0.005)
ln(own branch density) −0.018 −0.016 −0.019 −0.019 −0.004 −0.031
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.020)
ln(employees per branch) 0.039∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.001 0.088∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.002) (0.020)
ln(salary per employee) 0.206∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.024) (0.032)
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Deposit Fees).
All speciﬁcations include ﬁxed year and bank eﬀects.
Number of observations is 4203.
∗ -s i g n i ﬁcant at 10 percent or better
∗∗ -s i g n i ﬁcant at ﬁve percent or better
∗∗∗ -s i g n i ﬁcant at one percent or better
30Table 4. Market Share Regressions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
ATM share 0.041∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.013 0.043∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017)
ATM share×E(surcharge) 0.011∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Branch share 0.766∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.024)
ln(employees per branch) 0.022∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(salaries per employee) 0.011∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ln(deposit fees) −0.025∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Deposit share). All speciﬁcations include ﬁxed year
and bank eﬀects. Number of observations is 4160.
∗ -s i g n i ﬁcant at 10 percent or better
∗∗ -s i g n i ﬁcant at ﬁve percent or better
∗∗∗ -s i g n i ﬁcant at one percent or better
31Table B1. Second stage hedonics with time-invariant characteristics.
Variable Model 1
Multi-county bank dummy 0.113∗∗∗
(0.038)
Oﬀers credit card -0.063
(0.046)
Oﬀers money market 0.285
(0.218)
Oﬀers brokerage services 0.065∗
(0.040)
Part of BHC 0.527∗∗∗
(0.070)
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